用户:王桁霁/沙盒丙

死亡人数

圣克鲁斯大屠杀三十年忌时的悼念活动

占领统治时期的死亡人数难以确计。2005年，东帝汶接纳、真相与和解委员会得出“基于科学的主要结论”，认为在最保守的情形下，双方冲突造成的死亡人数达102,800（±12,000）。其中，18,600 （±1,000）人被杀害或失踪，另外84,000（±11,000）人死于饥荒或疾病，这些数字已远高于和平时期的正常死亡人数。委员会还称“因由冲突导致的疾病和饥饿而死的人”恐有180,000之多。由于该统计以 2004 年时在世的幸存者记叙为主要依据，因此在“家眷已全数罹难”且“墓碑不存”等情况下，死者则无法被统计在内。此外，委员会认为印尼军方应为约 70% 的暴力杀戮负责。

耶鲁大学种族灭绝学者本·基尔南称，尽管统计上有二十万或以上的数据，但“实际死亡人数应近于十五万人。” 根据天主教会的统计，东帝汶人口数从1974年的688,711减为1982年时的425,000，意味着东帝汶在印尼入侵与占领下有二十余万人死亡，“二十万死难”的统计此后在世界范围内被广泛援引。诸如大赦国际和人权观察等信源亦支持此数据。

法国专家加布里埃尔·德菲（Gabriel Defert）通过分析葡萄牙、印度尼西亚的可用官方数据，结合天主教会资料，认为1975年12月至1981年12月间，约有308,000名帝汶人死亡，约占侵略前总人口的44%。曾供职于爪哇沙拉笛加大学的乔治·阿迪琼德罗教授在研究印尼军方数据后总结称，在占领的头几年，事实上有300,000帝汶人被杀害。

澳洲国立大学教授罗伯特·科里布（Robert Cribb）通过质疑各次人口普查的准确性，继而认为“二十万死”的说法被严重夸大。 Robert Cribb of the Australian National University argues that the toll was significantly exaggerated. He argues that the 1980 census that counted 555,350 Timorese, although "the most reliable source of all," was probably a minimum rather than a maximum estimate for the total population. "It is worth recalling that hundreds of thousands of East Timorese disappeared during the violence of September 1999, only to reappear later," he writes.

The 1980 census becomes more improbable in the face of the 1987 census that counted 657,411 Timorese – this would require a growth rate of 2.5% per year, nearly identical to the very high growth rate in East Timor from 1970 to 1975, and a highly unlikely one given the conditions of the brutal occupation, including Indonesian efforts to discourage reproduction. Noting the relative lack of personal accounts of atrocities or of traumatised Indonesian soldiers, he further adds that East Timor "does not appear—on the basis of news reports and academic accounts—to be a society traumatized by mass death...the circumstance leading up to the Dili massacre of 1991...indicate a society which retained its vigour and indignation in a way which would probably not have been possible if it had been treated as Cambodia was treated under Pol Pot." Even Indonesian military strategy was based on winning the "hearts and minds" of the population, a fact that does not support charges of mass killing.

Kiernan, starting from a base population of 700,000 Timorese in 1975 (based on the 1974 Catholic Church census), calculated an expected 1980 population of 735,000 Timorese (assuming a growth rate of only 1% per year as a result of the occupation). Accepting the 1980 count that Cribb regards as at least 10% (55,000) too low, Kiernan concluded that as many as 180,000 might have died in the war. Cribb argued that the 3% growth rate suggested by the 1974 census was too high, citing the fact that the church had previously postulated a growth rate of 1.8%, which would have produced a figure in line with the Portuguese population estimate of 635,000 for 1974.

Although Cribb maintained that the Portuguese census was almost certainly an underestimate, he believed it to be more likely correct than the church census, since any church attempt to extrapolate the size of the total population "must be seen in light of its incomplete access to society" (less than half of Timorese were Catholic). Assuming a growth rate in line with the other nations of South East Asia, then, would yield a more accurate figure of 680,000 for 1975, and an expected 1980 population of slightly over 775,000 (without accounting for the decline in the birth rate resulting from the Indonesian occupation). The deficit remaining would be almost exactly 200,000. According to Cribb, Indonesian policies restricted the birth rate by up to 50% or more. Thus, around 45,000 of these were not born rather than killed; another 55,000 were "missing" as a result of the Timorese evading the Indonesian authorities who conducted the 1980 census. A variety of factors—the exodus of tens of thousands from their homes to escape FRETILIN in 1974–5; the deaths of thousands in the civil war; the deaths of combatants during the occupation; killings by FRETILIN; and natural disasters—diminish further still the civilian toll attributable to Indonesian forces during this time. Considering all this data, Cribb argues for a much lower toll of 100,000 or less, with an absolute minimum of 60,000, and a mere tenth of the civilian population dying unnaturally, for the years 1975–80.

Kiernan responded, however, by asserting that the influx of migrant workers during the occupation and the increase in the population growth rate typical of a mortality crisis justifies accepting the 1980 census as valid despite the 1987 estimate and that the 1974 church census—though a "possible maximum"—cannot be discounted because the church's lack of access to society might well have resulted in an undercount. He concluded that at least 116,000 combatants and civilians were killed by all sides or died "unnatural" deaths from 1975 to 1980 (if true, this would yield the result that about 15% of the civilian population of East Timor was killed from 1975 to 1980). F. Hiorth separately estimated that 13% (95,000 out of an expected 730,000 when accounting for the reduction in birth rates) of the civilian population died during this period. Kiernan believes that the deficit was most probably around 145,000 when accounting for the reduction in birth rates, or 20% of East Timor's population. The mid-value of the UN report is 146,000 deaths; R.J. Rummel, an analyst of political killings, estimates 150,000.

Many observers have called the Indonesian military action in East Timor an example of genocide. Oxford held an academic consensus calling the event genocide and Yale university teaches it as part of their "Genocide Studies" program. In a study of the word's legal meaning and applicability to the occupation of East Timor, legal scholar Ben Saul concludes that because no group recognized under international law was targeted by the Indonesian authorities, a charge of genocide cannot be applied. However, he also notes: "The conflict in East Timor most accurately qualifies as genocide against a ‘political group’, or alternatively as ‘cultural genocide’, yet neither of these concepts is explicitly recognised in international law." The occupation has been compared to the killings of the Khmer Rouge, the Yugoslav wars, and the Rwandan genocide.

印度尼西亚方面的伤亡情况则记载完备。印尼士兵与亲印尼民兵在入侵行动时阵亡的，以及占领时因病而死、意外身故的，共有2,300人。雅加达东部芝浪卡的军事总部内今竖有一座“莲之纪念碑（Monumen Seroja）”，纪念印度尼西亚莲之行动与对东帝汶的占领统治，其底部镌刻有这些死者的姓名。

Accurate numbers of Indonesian casualties are well-documented. The complete names of around 2,300 Indonesian soldiers and pro-Indonesian militias who died in action as well as from illness and accidents during the entire occupation are engraved into the Seroja Monument located in Armed Forces Headquarters in Cilangkap, East Jakarta.