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使用者:Robmarotiz/烏拉圭戰爭

< User:Robmarotiz
烏拉圭戰爭
Campagne de l'Uruguay, prise de Paysandu. — D'après un croquis de notre correspondant spécial.
畫報所繪《派桑杜攻城戰》（英語：Siege of Paysandú），繪於1865年
日期1864年8月10日 -1865年2月20日 (6個月1周又3天)
地點
結果

巴西帝國和紅黨勝利

參戰方
指揮官與領導者

烏拉圭戰爭，又稱1864年巴西入侵[A]（1864年8月10日-1865年2月20日）是發生在烏拉圭白黨政權和巴西帝國-烏拉圭紅黨（受到了阿根廷的秘密支援）同盟之間的戰爭。烏拉圭從獨立起，就遭受着紅白兩黨斷斷續續的奪權內鬥帶來的破壞。紅黨領袖貝南西奧·弗洛雷斯（英語：Venancio Flores）於1863年發起了旨在推翻紅白聯合政府的總統貝納爾多·貝羅（英語：Bernardo Berro）的解放運動，並得到了阿根廷的支持。阿根廷總統巴托洛梅·米特雷給弗洛雷斯送去了補給、志願者和軍用河運載具。

聯合政府最終因紅黨成員紛紛退出並加入弗洛雷斯的運動而崩潰。烏拉圭內戰的戰火逐步升級，演變成為破壞整個地區的穩定的國際危機。紅黨叛變前，聯合政府內的白黨就已經與巴拉圭獨裁者弗朗西斯科·索拉諾·洛佩斯達成了同盟。聯合政府崩潰後，反對米特雷和集權黨的阿根廷聯邦黨（英語：Federales (Argentina)）向白黨政府提供了支援。後來，巴西帝國也捲入了這場危機之中，令局勢進一步惡化：巴西帝國認為五分之一的烏拉圭人是巴西人，而他們中的一些人因為對白黨政府頒布的政策不滿（他們認為那些政策損害了他們的利益），參與了紅黨的叛亂，所以，巴西帝國最終為了重建南方邊境的安全和自己在那裡的地區優勢，決定干涉烏拉圭。

1864年4月，巴西派出全權代表（英語：Plenipotentiary）若澤·安東尼奧·薩賴瓦（英語：José Antônio Saraiva）與烏拉圭新總統阿塔納西奧·阿吉雷（英語：Atanasio Aguirre）談判。薩賴瓦最初試圖平息紅白兩黨之間的爭端，然而，因為阿吉雷拒絕妥協弗洛雷斯的要求，薩賴瓦放棄了，選擇站在紅黨這一邊。1864年8月10日，白黨政府拒絕了巴西的最後通牒，於是薩賴瓦宣布：巴西軍隊將對烏拉圭實施報復。巴西拒絕承認兩國間正式的戰爭狀態，並且在戰爭的大部分時間中，巴西都沒有對烏拉圭宣戰（英語：undeclared war）。

巴西-紅黨同盟對白黨陣地的進攻十分順利，他們穿越烏拉圭全境，攻占一座又一座城鎮。最終，白黨的陣地只剩下首都蒙得維的亞。於是，白黨政府於1865年2月20日宣布投降。這場短暫的戰爭本應成為巴西和阿根廷的大捷之役，可是，隨後巴拉圭在白黨的支持下開始襲擊巴西和阿根廷的領土，漫長而又代價高昂的巴拉圭戰爭就此爆發。

烏拉圭內戰

紅白黨衝突

參見：烏拉圭內戰
 
1864年的拉普拉塔平原，陰影區域為爭議區。

南美洲的烏拉圭東岸共和國自從1828年獨立起，就陷入了白黨與紅黨的內鬥之中。兩黨形成於19世紀30年代，產生於地方上的考迪羅們扶持的庇護關係，因此紅白兩黨的內鬥也蔓延到了烏拉圭全國。兩黨並非現代意義的政黨，而只是參與內鬥的兩個派系。他們的團結並非來源於共同的民族主義情緒，而是從自身保守的政治框架中產生的目標與忠誠[1]

烏拉圭人口稀疏，政府控制力弱。[1]因此，普通的公民不得不尋求地方上的考迪羅的庇護。這些考迪羅要麼是紅黨黨員，要麼是白黨黨員，他們將自己的工人（主要是高喬人騎手）組織成一支支私人部隊。為了戰勝對方，兩黨用盡各種殘酷策略，比如沒收土地、沒收牲畜和處決，這就讓兩黨間日益疏遠。暴行造成的敵對，加上家族忠誠和政治關係，令兩黨間的和解成為不可思議之事。19世紀的後半期中，大量來到烏拉圭的歐洲移民也被捲入了兩黨間的衝突。兩黨內部都有自由派和保守派，所以都能與移民的社會觀點和政治觀點相調和。內鬥還阻礙了烏拉圭中央政府的發展，使政府無法得到廣泛的支持。[2][3]

1863年解放運動

 
被拉普拉塔平原的考迪羅當作士兵的高喬人騎手。

19世紀50年代的後五年中，紅白兩黨的領袖們試圖達成和解。兩黨在許多黨員的贊同下頒布了許多「聯合主義」政策，開始在政府和軍隊中合作，並取得了相當的成效。[4][2]然而，紅黨內部的反動派在1858年發起叛亂抵制聯合計劃，使得彌補分裂的進程遭受到挫折。最後，叛亂被時任烏拉圭聯合政府總統（也是一位紅黨黨員）加夫列爾·佩雷拉（英語：Gabriel Antonio Pereira）鎮壓。叛軍領袖在內格羅河沿岸的帕索-德金特羅斯被處決，這卻引發了新的衝突。紅黨開始懷疑與白黨一起建設聯合政府會危害到紅黨自身，因此，紅黨號召支持者們為「金特羅斯的烈士」復仇。[2][5]

隨着聯合政府內部的弱點逐漸暴露，紅黨開始令支持者們退出聯合政府。紅黨領袖貝南西奧·弗洛雷斯（英語：Venancio Flores）准將是一名考迪羅和聯合政府的早期擁護者，他發現自己缺乏發動持久叛亂的軍事資源，於是前去求助阿根廷，希望阿根廷能夠介入兩黨間的衝突。[6]

自從1852年，獨裁者胡安·曼努埃爾·德·羅薩斯倒台起，阿根廷就分裂成了兩國：阿根廷邦聯和布宜諾斯艾利斯國。兩國都在競爭國家的主導權。[7]弗洛雷斯與布宜諾斯艾利斯國國防部長巴托洛梅·米特雷相互交涉，達成了如下共識：紅黨將支持布宜諾斯艾利斯國爭奪主導權，從而在紅黨攻擊蒙得維的亞（烏拉圭首都）的聯合政府時換取阿根廷的支持。[6]之後，弗洛雷斯和他的紅黨部隊堅定的為布宜諾斯艾利斯服務，並在1861年9月17日的帕翁戰役（英語：Battle of Pavón）中發揮了決定性的作用。在這場戰役中，阿根廷邦聯大敗，布宜諾斯艾利斯國統一了阿根廷。

為了履行承諾，米特雷在1863年5月和6月用阿根廷的渡輪把紅黨民兵、阿根廷志願軍和補給送到了烏拉圭，又令阿根廷海軍在沿途保衛渡輪不受烏拉圭炮艦機的攻擊。回到祖國後，弗洛雷斯呼籲推翻貝納爾多·貝羅（英語：Bernardo Berro）領導的憲政政府。弗洛雷斯還指控蒙得維的亞政府，說政府同情白黨並污衊自己的「解放運動」（他這麼稱呼自己的叛亂）是挑起紅白內鬥的行為。隨後，來自農村的紅黨黨員和軍隊中的叛逃者組織了起來，以響應弗洛雷斯的呼籲。[8]


國際衝突

巴拉圭與白黨的關係

 
1864年，阿根廷首都布宜諾斯艾利斯

儘管紅黨加入了弗洛雷斯的叛亂行列，但國民警衛隊堅持支持聯合政府。警衛隊開除了叛逃到弗洛雷斯那邊的軍官，然後讓白黨的游擊隊來填補空缺。[9]一些阿根廷聯邦黨（英語：Federales (Argentina)）黨員為了支持白黨，加入了白黨的隊伍。像烏拉圭一樣，阿根廷也遭受過長期的內鬥，不過在1861年的帕翁戰役中，米特雷領導的集權黨大勝胡斯托·何塞·德·烏爾基薩領導的聯邦黨，標誌着集權黨在阿根廷內戰中的勝利。米特雷否認自己介入了弗洛雷斯的叛亂，然而，他與紅黨的同盟廣為人知，並被認為是理所當然。[10]

Relations between Argentina and Uruguay worsened, and both nations came close to declaring war on each other, although neither could afford a direct military conflict. Argentina had only recently emerged from a long civil war, and was still struggling to suppress a Federalist rebellion in its western province of La Rioja. Uruguay was too weak militarily to engage in a fight unaided.[11][12]

Since 1862, the Blancos had made repeated overtures to Paraguay, governed by dictator Carlos Antonio López, in an attempt to forge an alliance[13][14] that might advance both their interests in the Platine region.[15][16] Upon the death of López, his son, Francisco Solano López, succeeded him as Paraguayan dictator. Unlike the elder López, who strove to avoid encumbering alliances, Solano greeted the Blancos' proposal with enthusiasm. He believed Argentina was working towards the annexation of both Uruguay and Paraguay, with the goal of recreating the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, the former Spanish colony that once encompassed the territories of all three nations. Solano López had, as far back as 1855, expressed this concern, commenting to the Uruguayan Andrés Lamas that "the idea of reconstructing [the old viceroyalty] is in the soul of the Argentines; and as a result, it isn't just Paraguay that needs to stand guard: your country, the Oriental Republic [of Uruguay], needs to get along with my own in order to prepare for any eventualities."[17] In late 1863, Solano López was mobilizing his army and was in talks with Urquiza, the leader of the dissident Argentine Federalists, to convince him to join the proposed Paraguayan–Uruguayan alliance.[18]

巴西和內戰

 
Rio de Janeiro, capital of the Empire of Brazil, c. 1865

The developments in Uruguay were closely watched by the Empire of Brazil,[19] which had vital interests in the Río de la Plata Basin. After Rosas fell in 1852, Brazil became the dominant regional power. Its foreign policy included the covert underwriting of opposition parties in Uruguay and Argentina, preventing strong governments that might threaten Brazil's strategic position in the area. Brazilian banking and commercial firms also had ventures in the area, furthering ties within the region. In Uruguay, the bank run by Irineu Evangelista de Sousa (Baron and later Viscount of Mauá) became so heavily involved in commercial enterprises that the economy depended on this source of continued capital flow.[20][21]

About 18 percent (40,000) of the Uruguayan population (220,000) spoke Portuguese and regarded themselves as Brazilian rather than Uruguayan.[B] Many within Flores' ranks were Brazilians, some hailing from the nearby Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul.[22][23] Life along the frontier between Rio Grande do Sul and Uruguay was often chaotic, with hostilities erupting between partisans of various cattle barons, cattle-rustling and random killings. Large landowners on both sides of the border had long been antagonistic toward Berro's policies.[24] The Uruguayan president attempted to tax the cattle coming from Rio Grande do Sul and to impose curbs on the use of Brazilian slaves within Uruguayan territory; slavery had been outlawed years before in Uruguay.[25]

Among the Brazilian land barons were David Canabarro and Antônio de Sousa Neto, both allies of Flores and former separatist rebels during the Ragamuffin War that had ravaged Rio Grande do Sul from 1835 until 1845.[26] Canabarro, a frontier military commander, misled Brazil's government by denying that Brazilians were crossing the border to join Flores.[27] Sousa Neto went to the Brazilian capital to request immediate government intervention in Uruguay, claiming that Brazilians were being murdered and their ranches robbed.[28] The "fact that Uruguayan citizens had just as valid claims against Brazil as Brazilians had against Uruguay was ignored", said historian Philip Raine.[29] Although Sousa Neto had ties with the governing political party, his claims, including that he could amass a force of 40,000 to invade Uruguay, were not taken seriously by all.[C] The Uruguayan crisis arrived at a difficult moment for Brazil, which was on the verge of a full-blown war with the British Empire for unrelated reasons. Brazil's government decided to intervene in Uruguay, fearful of showing any weakness in the face of an impending conflict with Britain, and believing that it would be better for the central government to take the lead rather than allow the Brazilian ranchers on the frontier to decide the course of events.[30]

Early engagements

Brazilian ultimatum

 
The steam frigate Amazonas served as part of the Brazilian naval fleet during the war.[31]

On 1 March 1864, Berro's term of office ended. The ongoing civil war prevented elections; therefore Atanasio Aguirre, president of the Uruguayan senate and a member of the Amapolas (the radical wing of the Blanco Party) replaced Berro, on an interim basis.[32][33] In April, José Antônio Saraiva was appointed minister plenipotentiary by the Brazilian government and charged with quickly reaching an accord that would settle Brazil's claims and ensure the safety of Brazilian citizens. His focus soon shifted from satisfying Brazil's terms to a more immediate goal of hammering out a deal between the antagonists in the civil war, with the expectation that only a more stable regime would be able to reach a settlement with Brazil.[34][35]

The government in Montevideo was at first reluctant to consider Saraiva's proposals. With backing from Paraguay, it saw little advantage in negotiating a close to the civil war or in seeking to comply with Brazil's demands.[36] The main factor, as historian Jeffrey D. Needell summarized, was that the "Uruguayan president had been unwilling to resolve these, particularly because the Brazilians whose grievances were at issue were allies of Venancio Flores, a client of the Argentines, and a man who was seeking his overthrow."[37] A mutual enmity between Brazil and its Hispanic-American neighbors compounded the difficulties, the result of a long-standing distrust and rivalry between Spain and Portugal that had been carried over to their former American colonies.[38] Brazil and Uruguay exhibited loathing for one another; as Robert Bontine Cunninghame Graham put it: "the Brazilians holding the Uruguayans as bloodthirsty savages, and the Uruguayans returning their contempt for the unwarlike ways of the Brazilians, whom they called monkeys, and looked down upon, for their mixed blood."[38]

Eventually, in July 1864, Saraiva's persistent diplomacy moved the Uruguayan government to agree to mediated talks including Edward Thornton (the British resident minister in Buenos Aires), Argentine foreign minister Rufino de Elizalde and Saraiva himself.[39] Initially, the negotiations seemed promising, but soon bogged down. On 4 August, convinced that the government in Montevideo was unwilling to work toward a settlement, a frustrated Saraiva delivered an ultimatum, which the Uruguayans rebuffed. On 10 August, Saraiva informed Aguirre that the Brazilian military commanders would receive orders to begin retaliation, marking the beginning of the war.[40]

Alliance with rebel Colorados

 
The Uruguayan steamship Villa del Salto after it ran aground and was set on fire by its crew

Under the orders of Vice-Admiral Joaquim Marques Lisboa (Baron of Tamandaré), a Brazilian fleet was stationed in Uruguayan territorial waters. The naval force comprised twelve steamships: one frigate, six corvettes and five gunboats.[31] On 11 August 1864, Tamandaré, as the commander-in-chief of Brazilian naval and land forces in the war,[41] received orders from Saraiva to begin retaliatory operations.[42] Brazilian warships were deployed to the Uruguayan towns of Salto, Paysandú and Maldonado, ostensibly to "protect Brazilian subjects", while Uruguay's only warships, the small steamers Villa del Salto and General Artigas, were to be neutralized.[43] When Tamandaré demanded these steamships remain at their docks, only the crew of General Artigas complied.[44]

Tamandaré created a naval command assigned to Captain of Sea and War Francisco Pereira Pinto (later Baron of Ivinhema). Consisting of two corvettes and one gunboat, the division was sent to patrol the Uruguay River, a tributary of the Río de la Plata and part of the Platine region.[31][43] On 24 August, Pereira Pinto sighted the Villa del Salto, which was conveying troops to fight the Colorados. The Villa del Salto ignored warning shots and a demand to surrender; after a desperate run from the Brazilian warships, it escaped to Argentine waters.[45] This first skirmish of the war prompted the Uruguayan government to sever all diplomatic ties with Brazil on 30 August.[46] On 7 September, Pereira Pinto again encountered the Villa del Salto sailing from Salto to Paysandú. The two Brazilian corvettes attacked the Uruguayan ship as it again tried to escape to Argentina. The battle ended when the Villa del Salto ran aground near Paysandú, where its crew set it on fire to prevent it falling into Brazilian hands.[47] Meanwhile, the General Artigas had been sold to prevent its capture by the Brazilians.[48]

To Flores, Brazil's military operations against the Blanco government represented a priceless opportunity, since he had been unable to achieve any lasting results during the rebellion. He entered talks with Saraiva, winning the Brazilian government over, after promising to settle their claims refused by the Blanco government. The Brazilian plenipotentiary minister gave instructions to Tamandaré to form a joint offensive with the Colorado leader and overthrow the Blancos.[49] On 20 October, after a swift exchange of letters, Flores and the Brazilian vice-admiral formed a secret alliance.[50]

Colorado–Brazil joint offensive

Sieges of Uruguayan towns

 
Civilians departing Paysandú during the siege, 1864

The Brazilian naval fleet in Uruguay was supposed to work in conjunction with a Brazilian land force. But months passed, and the "Army of the South" (called the "Division of Observation" until the ultimatum) stationed in Piraí Grande (in Rio Grande do Sul) was still not ready to cross into Uruguayan territory. Its main objectives were to occupy the Uruguayan towns of Paysandú, Salto and Melo; once taken, they were to be handed over to Flores and his Colorados.[51]

On 12 October, a brigade led by Brigadier José Luís Mena Barreto detached from the main army. Two days later, near the Brazilian town of Jaguarão, the force invaded Uruguay's Cerro Largo Department. After skirmishes failed to halt their march, the Blancos abandoned Melo, and the brigade entered this capital of Cerro Largo unopposed, on 16 October. After handing over control of Melo to the Uruguayan Colorados, the Brazilians withdrew on 24 October, to rejoin their Army of the South.[52] The next Brazilian target was Salto. Pereira Pinto sent two gunboats under First Lieutenant Joaquim José Pinto to blockade the town. On 24 November, Flores arrived with his troops and began the siege. Colonel José Palomeque, commander of the Uruguayan garrison, surrendered almost without firing a shot, on the afternoon of 28 November.[53] Flores' army captured and incorporated four artillery pieces and 250 men;[54] 300 Colorados and 150 Brazilians were left behind to occupy Salto.[54]

Paysandú, the last Brazilian target, was already under blockade by Pereira Pinto.[55] Tamandaré, who had been in Buenos Aires until this point, took charge of the blockade on 3 December. It was enforced by one corvette and four gunboats.[56][57] Paysandú was garrisoned by 1,274 men and 15 cannons, under the command of Colonel Leandro Gómez.[58] Flores, who had come from Salto, headed a force of 3,000 men, mostly cavalry.[56] He invested Paysandú, deploying 800 infantrymen, 7 cannons (3 of which were rifled), and detachments of an additional 660 Brazilians.[59] Gómez declined the offer to surrender.[56][57] From 6 December until 8 December, the Brazilians and Colorados made attempts to storm the town, advancing through the streets, but were unable to take it.[60] Tamandaré and Flores opted to wait for the arrival of the Army of the South.[60] Meanwhile, Aguirre had sent General Juan Sáa with 3,000 men and four cannons to relieve the besieged town, forcing the Brazilians and Colorados to briefly lift the siege while dealing with this new threat. Sáa abandoned his advance before encountering the enemy force, and fled north of the Río Negro.[61]

Army of the South in Paysandú

主條目：Siege of Paysandú
 
Brazilian navy and army troops during the siege of Paysandú, 1865

Rather than the show of force that had been intended by the Brazilian government, the war revealed the Empire's lack of military readiness. The Army of the South, stationed in Piraí Grande, was commanded by Field Marshal João Propício Mena Barreto (later Baron of São Gabriel) with two divisions. The 1st Division, under Brigadier Manuel Luís Osório (later Marquis of Erval), was formed by regular army units. The 2nd Division, under Brigadier José Luís Mena Barreto (who had since returned from his attack on Melo), was composed entirely of national guardsmen. Altogether, it numbered only 5,711 men—all (except some officers) native to Rio Grande do Sul.[D] The army was poorly equipped for siege operations: it brought along no engineers (who could direct the construction of trenches); it was under-equipped, lacking even hatchets (necessary to cut fences, break through doors and scale walls); and its 12 cannons (a mix of La Hitte and Paixhans) were of small calibers ill-suited to attacking fortifications.[62]

On 1 December, almost four months after Saraiva presented the ultimatum, the Army of the South invaded Uruguay.[63] Its troops were accompanied by a semi-independent militia unit, consisting of no more than 1,300 Brazilian gaucho cavalrymen, under the former Ragamuffin Antônio de Sousa Neto.[64] The 7,011-strong force (with 200 supply carts)[63] marched through Uruguayan territory unopposed, heading toward Paysandú in the southwest. The disorganized and undisciplined bands of gauchos, who formed the armies of both Blancos and Colorados, were no match for the Brazilian troops. The Uruguayan gauchos "had combat experience but no training and were poorly armed save for the usual muskets, boleadoras, and facón knives", remarked historian Thomas L. Whigham.[65] "Fire arms he [the Uruguayan gaucho] rarely possessed", said Cunninghame Graham, "or if by chance he owned a pair of long brass-mounted pistols or a flintlock blunderbuss, they were in general out of order and unserviceable. Upon the other hand, a little training made him a formidable adversary with the sabre and the lance."[66]

Field Marshal João Propício Mena Barreto reached Paysandú on 29 December with two infantry brigades and one artillery regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Émile Louis Mallet (later Baron of Itapevi).[63][67] The Army of the South's cavalry established its camp a few kilometers away.[63][68] Meanwhile, Gómez beheaded forty Colorados[69] and fifteen Brazilian prisoners and "hung their still-dripping heads above his trenches in full view of their compatriots."[70] On 31 December, the Brazilians and Colorados recommenced their attack and overran the city's defenses, after a bitter struggle, on 2 January 1865.[68][71] The Brazilians captured Gómez and handed him over to the Colorados. Colonel Gregorio "Goyo" Suárez shot Gómez and three of his officers.[72][73] According to Whigham, "Suárez's actions were not really unexpected, as several members of his immediate family had fallen victim to Gómez's wrath against the Colorados."[74]

Blanco capitulation

Further operations

 
The route taken by the Army of the South during the war

On 12 November 1864, before the siege of Paysandú, the Paraguayan dictator Solano López seized the Brazilian steamer Marquês de Olinda, beginning the Paraguayan War. While the Army of the South crossed Uruguay heading toward Paysandú, Brazil's government sent José Maria da Silva Paranhos (later Viscount of Rio Branco) to replace Saraiva. He arrived in the Argentine capital of Buenos Aires on 2 December and a few days later sought a formal alliance with Mitre against the Blancos. The Argentine president refused, insisting that neither he nor his government had any role in Flores' rebellion, and that Argentina would remain neutral.[75] On 26 December, the Paraguayans invaded the Brazilian province of Mato Grosso, laying waste to towns and the countryside.[76][77]

As the situation deteriorated, the Brazilian government mobilized army units from other regions of the Empire. On 1 January 1865, one brigade (composed of two infantry battalions and one artillery battalion) with 1,700 men from the Brazilian province of Rio de Janeiro disembarked and occupied the Uruguayan town of Fray Bentos.[78] Paranhos, along with Tamandaré, met Flores in Fray Bentos and decided to launch a combined attack against Montevideo.[79] It was apparent that the Paraguayans would take too long to reach Uruguay and no help would come from Urquiza and his Argentine Federalists.[80] Increasingly isolated, Aguirre hoped that the foreign powers could intervene, but when, on 11 January, he asked the diplomatic corps in Montevideo whether they would provide military assistance to him and his government, none responded positively.[81][82] João Propício Mena Barreto sailed from Fray Bentos on 14 January with the Brazilian infantry, bound for a landing near the mouth of the Santa Lucía River near Montevideo.[83] On the way, he occupied the Uruguayan town of Colonia del Sacramento, garrisoning it with 50 soldiers.[84]

The cavalry and artillery were placed under Osório and went overland. They met João Propício Mena Barreto and the infantry at their landing place. From there, the reunited Army of the South marched on Montevideo.[84] On 31 January, Brazil and the Colorados besieged the Uruguayan capital.[84][85] In the meantime, on 19 January, Paranhos attempted to clarify the nature of the Brazilian operations against the Blancos. He issued notes to the foreign diplomatic corps in Buenos Aires declaring that a state of war existed between Brazil and Uruguay. Until then, there had been no formal declaration of war, and the Empire's military operations in Uruguay since August 1864 had been mere "reprisals"—the vague term used by Brazilian diplomacy since the ultimatum.[86]

Armistice

 
Montevideo, capital of Uruguay, 1865

In an attempt to divert the attention of Brazil from the siege of the capital, the Blanco government ordered the "Vanguard Army of the Republic of Uruguay", composed of 1,500 men under General Basilio Muñoz, to invade Brazilian soil. On 27 January 1865, Muñoz crossed the border and exchanged fire with 500 cavalrymen from Brazil's National Guard units. The Brazilians retreated to the town of Jaguarão, where they were joined by 90 infantrymen also from the National Guard, and hurriedly constructed trenches. There were also two small steamers and one other large vessel, each equipped with one artillery piece, to protect Jaguarão. The Blanco army attacked the town in the Battle of Jaguarão, but were repelled. Muñoz established a brief siege and asked Colonel Manuel Pereira Vargas (the commander of the Brazilian garrison) to surrender, but to no effect. In the early hours of 28 January, Muñoz retreated with his men toward Uruguay, ransacking property and taking all the slaves they could find.[E]

On 2 February, Tamandaré declared to foreign diplomats that Montevideo was under siege and blockade.[87] The Uruguayan capital was defended by between 3,500 and 4,000 armed men with little to no combat experience and 40 artillery pieces of various calibers.[88] On 16 February, the Army of the South was further reinforced by 1,228 men from the 8th Battalion of Caçadores (Sharpshooters) arriving from the Brazilian province of Bahia, raising its numbers to 8,116.[89] Sousa Neto and his gauchos had detached from the main force weeks before to pursue Muñoz and his army.[90] British and French nationals were evacuated to Buenos Aires. The "general exodus of foreigners that followed caused those who remained in Montevideo to feel terror for the first time. All agreed that a full-scale assault against the city could not be postponed."[91] However, neither Paranhos nor his government were willing to risk the destruction of Montevideo and face the inevitable outcry from other nations that would follow it.[92]

On 15 February, Aguirre's term of office expired.[93] Against the wishes of the Amapolas, the moderate Tomás Villalba was elected by the Senate to replace Aguirre. French, Italian and Spanish troops landed in Montevideo at Villalba's request to dissuade the radical Blancos from attempting a coup to retake power.[94] Villalba entered into talks with Flores and Paranhos. With the Italian resident minister Raffaele Ulisse Barbolani serving as intermediary, an agreement was reached. Flores and Manuel Herrera y Obes (representing Villalba's government) signed a peace accord on 20 February at the Villa de la Unión. A general amnesty was granted to both Blancos and Colorados, and Villalba handed over the presidency to Flores on an interim basis until elections could be held.[95]

Aftermath

 
Brazilian troops in Rio Grande do Sul heading toward the front, 1865
主條目：Paraguayan War

In early March, Flores assembled a cabinet composed entirely of Colorados, among them a brother of the Blanco Leandro Gómez.[96] The new Uruguayan president purged government departments of employees with Fusionist or Blanco associations. All Blanco officers and enlisted men were eliminated from the army and replaced by those Colorado and Brazilian loyalists who had remained with Flores throughout the conflict. Public commemorations glorified the Colorados, and a monument dedicated to the "Martyrs of Quinteros" was erected.[97] The costs of the Liberating Crusade are unknown. Flores' losses amounted to around 450 dead and wounded;[98] there are no estimates of the number of civilians who died of famine and disease, nor is it known how much damage was sustained by the national economy. The effects of the Uruguayan War have received little attention from historians, who have been drawn to focus on the dramatic devastation suffered by Paraguay in the subsequent Paraguayan War.[F]

News of the war's end was brought by Pereira Pinto and met with joy in Rio de Janeiro. Brazilian Emperor Dom Pedro II found himself waylaid by a crowd of thousands in the streets amid acclamations.[99][100] But public opinion quickly changed for the worse, when newspapers began running stories painting the accord of 20 February as harmful to Brazilian interests, for which the cabinet was blamed. The newly raised Viscount of Tamandaré and Mena Barreto (now Baron of São Gabriel) had supported the peace accord.[101] Tamandaré changed his mind soon afterward and played along with the allegations. Paranhos (a member of the opposition party) was used as a scapegoat by the Emperor and the government, and was recalled in disgrace to the imperial capital.[102] Subsequent events show the accusation was unfounded. Not only had Paranhos managed to settle all Brazilian claims, but by avoiding the death of thousands, he gained a willing and grateful Uruguayan ally, not a dubious and resentful one — who provided Brazil an important base of operations during the war with Paraguay that followed.[103]

Victory brought mixed results for Brazil and Argentina. As the Brazilian government had expected, the conflict was a short-lived and relatively easy affair that led to the installation of a friendly government in Uruguay. The official estimates included 549 battlefield casualties (109 dead, 439 wounded and 1 missing) from the navy and army and an unknown number who died from disease.[96] Historian José Bernardino Bormann put the total at 616 (204 dead, 411 wounded and 1 missing).[98] The war would have been deemed an outstanding success for Brazil, had it not been for its terrible consequences. Instead of demonstrating strength, Brazil revealed military weakness that an emboldened Paraguay sought to exploit. From the Argentine viewpoint, most of Bartolomé Mitre's expectations were frustrated by the war's outcome. He had succeeded in bringing to power his friend and ally, but the minimal risk and cost to Argentina he had envisioned at the outset proved to be illusory. The resulting attack by Paraguay on Brazilian and Argentine provinces sparked the long and devastating Paraguayan War.[104]

Notes

  1. ^ 西班牙語：Invasión brasileña de 1864；葡萄牙語：Guerra do Uruguai。
  2. ^ According to the 1860 census, there were 220,000 inhabitants in Uruguay. Of this number, 120,000 spoke Spanish and considered themselves Uruguayans. All the others were considered foreigners, including 18,000 Spanish, 10,000 Italians and 9,000 French. These were European immigrants who had arrived following Uruguayan independence in 1828. Descendants of intermarriages between Brazilian and other nationalities living in Uruguay were not counted among the 40,000 figure. The Uruguayan foreign minister, Juan José de Herrera, confirmed these numbers to Saraiva in 1864 (Golin 2004，第194, 249頁).
  3. ^ Luís Alves de Lima e Silva (Marquis and later Duke of Caxias) best illustrated the skepticism of, and opposition to, Neto when he bluntly responded that not even 1,000 men could be gathered, much less 40,000, to fight this war (Costa 1996，第133頁).
  4. ^ The Empire did not rely upon general conscription, and only later mobilized additional units from other provinces. José Paranhos, Baron of Rio Branco, in his notes on Louis Schneider's work, and José Bernardino Bormann said that the Army of the South had 5,711 men (Schneider 2009，第63頁; Bormann 1907，第180頁). Gustavo Barroso and Augusto Tasso Fragoso gave round numbers: 5,700 and 6,000, respectively (Barroso 1935，第207頁; Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第146頁).
  5. ^ A few books claim that Muñoz's men raped Brazilian women during their retreat from Jaguarão (Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第246–247頁; Osório & Osório 1915，第20–21頁). The sole contemporary source mentioning the rapes was an article in a gazette (Schneider 2009，第102頁). The attack on Jaguarão only became widely known following an official report submitted by the president (governor) of Rio Grande do Sul, in which there is no mention of violence toward Brazilian women, only of looting and the kidnapping of slaves.(Schneider 2009，第88–89, 102頁; Golin 2004，第304–305頁; Bormann 1907，第210–215頁). It is known that one Brazilian (a former Ragamuffin officer) was castrated and had his ears cut off after he was killed, a common practice among gauchos (Bormann 1907，第215頁).
  6. ^ No figures are given in classic contemporary works such as George Thompson's The War in Paraguay (published in 1869), George Frederick Masterman's Seven eventful years in Paraguay (1870), Richard Francis Burton's Letters from the battlefields of Paraguay (1870), Charles Ames Washburn's The History of Paraguay (1871), Max von Versen's Reisen in Amerika und der Südamerikanische Krieg (1872) and Louis Schneider's Der Krieg der Triple-Allianz (1872–75). The subject is also ignored in later, well-known histories such as José Bernardino Bormann's A Campanha do Uruguai (1907), Augusto Tasso Fragoso's História da Guerra entre a Tríplice Aliança e o Paraguai (1934) and Francisco Doratioto's Maldita guerra: nova história da Guerra do Paraguai (2002). The same omission is found in English-language works that deal with the war, such as Thomas L. Whigham's The Paraguayan War: Causes and early conduct (2002), Chris Leuchars' To the bitter end: Paraguay and the War of the Triple Alliance (2002), Hendrik Kraay and Thomas L. Whigham's I die with my country: perspectives on the Paraguayan War, 1864–1870 (2004) and Terry D. Hooker's The Paraguayan War (2008).

References

  1. ^ 1.0 1.1 Kraay & Whigham 2004，第119頁.
  2. ^ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Kraay & Whigham 2004，第120頁.
  3. ^ Munro 1960，第201–202頁.
  4. ^ Leuchars 2002，第20頁.
  5. ^ Whigham 2002，第124頁.
  6. ^ 6.0 6.1 Kraay & Whigham 2004，第121頁.
  7. ^ 見：
  8. ^ 見：
  9. ^ Kraay & Whigham 2004，第122頁.
  10. ^ 見：
  11. ^ Whigham 2002，第138–139頁.
  12. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第107–114頁.
  13. ^ Whigham 2002，第139–140頁.
  14. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第162–180頁.
  15. ^ Whigham 2002，第140–141頁.
  16. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第164, 169頁.
  17. ^ Whigham 2002，第441頁.
  18. ^ Whigham 2002，第142頁.
  19. ^ Whigham 2002，第144頁.
  20. ^ Whigham 2002，第123頁.
  21. ^ Bethell 1985，第662頁.
  22. ^ Golin 2004，第200–202, 218, 268–269頁.
  23. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第116頁.
  24. ^ See:
  25. ^ See:
  26. ^ Golin 2004，第243頁.
  27. ^ Golin 2004，第201–202頁.
  28. ^ See:
  29. ^ Raine 1956，第161頁.
  30. ^ See:
  31. ^ 31.0 31.1 31.2 Maia 1975，第260頁.
  32. ^ Whigham 2002，第148–149頁.
  33. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第107頁.
  34. ^ Raine 1956，第161–162頁.
  35. ^ Whigham 2002，第147–151頁.
  36. ^ Raine 1956，第162頁.
  37. ^ Needell 2006，第240頁.
  38. ^ 38.0 38.1 Graham 1933，第127頁.
  39. ^ See:
  40. ^ See:
  41. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第258–259頁.
  42. ^ Golin 2004，第271頁.
  43. ^ 43.0 43.1 Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第137頁.
  44. ^ See:
  45. ^ See:
  46. ^ Maia 1975，第263頁.
  47. ^ See:
  48. ^ Golin 2004，第282, 286頁.
  49. ^ Golin 2004，第287–290頁.
  50. ^ See:
  51. ^ See:
  52. ^ See:
  53. ^ See:
  54. ^ 54.0 54.1 Schneider 2009，第67頁.
  55. ^ Schneider 2009，第65頁.
  56. ^ 56.0 56.1 56.2 Schneider 2009，第70頁.
  57. ^ 57.0 57.1 Maia 1975，第264頁.
  58. ^ See:
  59. ^ See:
  60. ^ 60.0 60.1 See:
  61. ^ See:
  62. ^ Schneider 2009，第63, 77頁.
  63. ^ 63.0 63.1 63.2 63.3 Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第154頁.
  64. ^ See:
  65. ^ Whigham 2002，第174頁.
  66. ^ Graham 1933，第122–123頁.
  67. ^ Maia 1975，第265頁.
  68. ^ 68.0 68.1 Maia 1975，第266頁.
  69. ^ Barroso 1935，第206頁.
  70. ^ Whigham 2002，第458頁.
  71. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第154–155頁.
  72. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第155頁.
  73. ^ Bormann 1907，第202–203頁.
  74. ^ Whigham 2002，第459頁.
  75. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第160–161頁.
  76. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第227頁.
  77. ^ Leuchars 2002，第35頁.
  78. ^ See:
  79. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第158頁.
  80. ^ Whigham 2002，第227–228頁.
  81. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第247–248頁.
  82. ^ Schneider 2009，第87頁.
  83. ^ Schneider 2009，第88頁.
  84. ^ 84.0 84.1 84.2 Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第159頁.
  85. ^ Silva 1906b，第239頁.
  86. ^ See:
  87. ^ See:
  88. ^ Schneider 2009，第83, 86頁.
  89. ^ Schneider 2009，第82頁.
  90. ^ Bormann 1907，第214頁.
  91. ^ Whigham 2002，第235頁.
  92. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第249頁.
  93. ^ See:
  94. ^ See:
  95. ^ See:
  96. ^ 96.0 96.1 Schneider 2009，第104頁.
  97. ^ Kraay & Whigham 2004，第123頁.
  98. ^ 98.0 98.1 Bormann 1907，第294頁.
  99. ^ Bormann 1907，第281頁.
  100. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第254頁.
  101. ^ Schneider 2009，第99頁.
  102. ^ Needell 2006，第227頁.
  103. ^ See:
  104. ^ Golin 2004，第200, 210, 314頁.

Bibliography

  • Barroso, Gustavo. História Militar do Brasil. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional. 1935 （Portuguese）. 
  • Bethell, Leslie. The Cambridge History of Latin America 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1985. ISBN 0-521-23224-4. 
  • Bormann, José Bernardino. A Campanha do Uruguay (1864–65). Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional. 1907 （Portuguese）. 
  • Carvalho, José Murilo de. D. Pedro II: Ser ou Não Ser. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras. 2007. ISBN 978-85-359-0969-2 （Portuguese）. 
  • Costa, Wilma Peres. A Espada de Dâmocles: o Exército, a Guerra do Paraguai e a Crise do Império. São Paulo: HUCITEC. 1996. ISBN 85-271-0245-5 （Portuguese）. 
  • Golin, Tau. A Fronteira 2. Porto Alegre: L&PM. 2004. ISBN 978-85-254-1438-0 （Portuguese）. 
  • Graham, Robert Bontine Cunninghame. Portrait of a Dictator. London: William Heinemann. 1933. 
  • Hooker, Terry D. The Paraguayan War. Nottingham: Foundry Books. 2008. ISBN 1-901543-15-3. 
  • Kraay, Hendrik; Whigham, Thomas L. I Die with My Country: Perspectives on the Paraguayan War, 1864–1870. Dexter, Michigan: Thomson-Shore. 2004. ISBN 978-0-8032-2762-0. 
  • Leuchars, Chris. To the Bitter End: Paraguay and the War of the Triple Alliance. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. 2002. ISBN 0-313-32365-8. 
  • Maia, Prado. A Marinha de Guerra do Brasil na Colônia e no Império 2. Rio de Janeiro: Cátedra. 1975 （Portuguese）. 
  • Munro, Dana Gardner. The Latin American Republics: A History 3. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1960. 
  • Needell, Jeffrey D. The Party of Order: the Conservatives, the State, and Slavery in the Brazilian Monarchy, 1831–1871. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2006. ISBN 978-0-8047-5369-2. 
  • Osório, Joaquim Luís; Osório, Fernando Luís. História do General Osório 1. Pelotas: Tipografia do Diário Popular. 1915 （Portuguese）. 
  • Raine, Philip. Paraguay. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press. 1956. 
  • Schneider, Louis. A Guerra da Tríplice Aliança Contra o Paraguai. Porto Alegre: Pradense. 2009. ISBN 978-85-89072-13-7 （Portuguese）. 
  • Silva, Alfredo Pretextato Maciel da. Os Generais do Exército Brasileiro de 1822 a 1889: Traços Biográficos 2. Rio de Janeiro: M. Orosco & C. 1906b （Portuguese）. 
  • Tasso Fragoso, Augusto. História da Guerra entre a Tríplice Aliança e o Paraguai 1 3. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército. 2009 （Portuguese）. 
  • Williams, Mary Wilhelmine. Dom Pedro the Magnanimous, Second Emperor of Brazil. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press. 1937. 
  • Whigham, Thomas L. The Paraguayan War: Causes and Early Conduct 1. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. 2002. ISBN 978-0-8032-4786-4. 

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